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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

,
Petitioner,
ANSWER
-againstIndex No.:
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, BOARD OF
PAROLE,
Respondent.

Respondent, by its attorney, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New
York, Lynn Knapp Blake of counsel, answers the petition as follows:
1.

Denies each and every allegation contained in the petition that alleges or tends to

allege that the challenged action was in any way contrary to constitutional, statutory, regulatory or
case law.
2.

Admits the allegations in paragraph 1 of the petition insofar as they constitute a

characterization of the petition, and denies all allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Respondent.
3.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the petition.

4.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the petition in that it alleges that

the Department of Correctional Services and Community Supervision is the Respondent;
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respectfully refers to the applicable statutory authority for a description of its duties and
responsibilities.
5.

Paragraph 5 of the petition is a venue statement and as such requires no response.

6.

As to the allegations contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19,

20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the
petition, respectfully refers the Court to the records submitted herein by the Respondent as the best
evidence and most accurate version of petitioner’s Sentence and Commitment, institutional
programs and achievements, criminal history, appearances before the Board, decisions and
appeals; denies the allegations to the extent that they are inconsistent with the record and insofar
as they allege any wrongdoing on the part of the Respondent.
7.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 8, 12, 39, 45, 46 and under the

heading “CLAIMS’ in the petition.
8.

Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity

of the allegations contained in paragraphs 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
petition.
9.

The Wherefore clause in the petition sets forth the relief sought by the Petitioner to

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondent denies that
petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.
10.

Deny each and every allegation of the petition not specifically responded to above.
OBJECTIONS IN POINT OF LAW

11.

The petition fails to state a cause of action. CPLR 3211(a)(7).
2
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^

RECEIVEPlM

28

Any issues raised in this petition that were not raised in the administrative appeal

have not been preserved for review and may not be raised for the first time in this Article 78

proceeding. CPLR § 3211(a)(2 ).

RECORD BEFORE THE AGENCY BELOW

The following constitutes a portion of the record before the administrative agency and

Respondent's exhibits:
A.

Sentence & Commitments:

B.

Pre Sentence Investigation Report (confidential and submitted for in camera
inspection only;

C.

Parole Board Report June 2016;

D.

-

Confidential portion of Parole Board Report June 2016 (submitted for in

camera inspection only);
E.

Sentencing Minutes dated May 12, 1975;

F.

COMPAS Risk Assessment (confidential and submitted for
in camera inspection only);

G.

Case Plan;

H.

Parole Board Interview transcripts for June 21, 2016, September
18, 2012 and August 1, 2006;

I.

Parole Board Release Decision dated October 10, 2016;

J.

Administrative Appeal date stamped November 7, 2016;

K.

Administrative Appeal Decision Notice and Findings dated December 12, 2016;

L.

Andrea W. Evans Memorandum dated October 5, 2011; and

M.

District Attorney Letters ( confidential and submitted for in camera inspection ).
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WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully requests that the relief requested in the petition
be denied, and that the petition and this proceeding be dismissed. In the event the Court grants
the petition, Respondent requests that the Court remand the matter for a rehearing at which the
technical matters complained of by the Petitioner may be remedied, together with such other
relief as may be just and proper.
Dated: Albany, New York
June 9, 2017
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Lynn Knapp Blake
Lynn Knapp Blake
Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel
Telephone: (518) 776-2598
Fax: (518) 915-7740 (not for service of papers)

TO:
Attorney for Petitioner
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VERIFICATION
Lynn Knapp Blake, an attorney admitted to practice in the State of New York, affirms
under the following penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR §2106:
I am an Assistant Attorney General of counsel in this matter to Eric T. Schneiderman,
Attorney General of the State of New York, attorney for Respondents. I have been assigned to
defend this proceeding and I am acquainted with the pleadings, papers, and proceedings to date. I
have personally examined the exhibits annexed to the foregoing answer and the records of
Respondents referred to in the answer.
I have read the foregoing answer. The same is true to my knowledge, except as to those
matters alleged upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
I make this verification pursuant to CPLR § 3020(d)(2) because Respondents are entities
of the State of New York, and I am acquainted with the facts of this proceeding.
Dated: Albany, New York
June 9, 2017
Lynn Knapp Blake
Lynn Knapp Blake

Printed [Reproduced] on Recycle Paper
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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In the Matter of the Application of

Petitioner,

For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
-againstDEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, BOARD OF
PAROLE,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224-0341

Lynn Knapp Blake
Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel
Telephone: (518) 776-2598
Fax: (518) 915-7740 (Not for service of papers)
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This memorandum of law is submitted in support of the Respondent’s answer and in
opposition to the petition of

. Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the New

York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), currently
incarcerated at Shawangunk Correctional Facility.
Petitioner is serving an aggregate indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to life
after being convicted of two counts of Murder. (Exhibit A; Exhibit B, confidential and submitted
for in camera inspection). The instant offense consisted of petitioner, acting in concert with
another individual, shooting and killing two police officers that had responded to a call for
and the other individual then took the officers’ guns and fled the scene.

assistance.

was later apprehended on an unrelated charge in San Francisco. Descriptions of the events
surrounding Petitioner’s instant offense, as well as an analysis of his criminal history, are set forth
in his Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). (Exhibit B).
A Parole Board Report was prepared in June 2016 for Petitioner’s reappearance interview
with the Board. (Exhibits C and D, submitted for in camera inspection). Petitioner’s Sentencing
minutes, COMPAS Re-Entry Risk Assessment (“COMPAS”) and Case Plan were also available
for the Board’s review. (Exhibit E; Exhibit F, (confidential and submitted for in camera inspection
only); Exhibit G).
On June 21, 2016, Petitioner appeared in front of the Board for a Reappearance interview.
(Exhibit H, pp. 1-23). Following the interview, Petitioner was denied discretionary release to
parole supervision. (Exhibit I, pp. 2, 3).
On or about November 7, 2016, the Appeals unit received his administrative appeal.
(Exhibit J).

The Appeals Unit issued a decision affirming the Board’s decision denying
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Petitioner’s release to community supervision on December 12, 2016. (Exhibit K). Petitioner’s
administrative remedies are deemed exhausted.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Petitioner brings the instant Article 78 proceeding claiming that the Board’s decision was
arbitrary and capricious on the following grounds: (i) the Board based its release denial almost
exclusively on the seriousness of the offense (Petition, ¶¶ 12, 45, 53, MOL); (ii) the Board did not
adhere to the statutory factors, focusing on and considering non-statutory factors (Petition,
“Argument”; MOL); (iii) the Board failed to properly consider and apply the COMPAS Risk and
Needs Assessment Tool (Petition, “Claims”; MOL); (iv) the Board failed to comply with the 2011
amendments to the Executive Law in that the statutes are now present and rehabilitation based (MOL,
p. 1); (v) the Board’s decision fails to provide adequate detail and was a foregone conclusion
(MOL, pp. 2, 5, 12); (vi) the Board’s decision constitutes an unauthorized resentencing (MOL, p.
3); (vii) the Board was biased and badgered him during the interview (MOL, pp. 3, 12); and (viii)
the Board denied him the opportunity to review the PBA “lobbying” for accuracy before it was
considered by the Board (MOL, pp. 10, 11). As evidenced in detail below, Petitioner’s claims
have no merit.
A review of Petitioner’s administrative appeal (Exhibit J) reveals that he has presented
issues in his petition that were not raised in his administrative appeal. Specifically, (i) the Board’s
decision constitutes an unauthorized resentencing; (ii) the Board was biased and badgered him
during the interview; and (iii) the Board denied him the opportunity to review the PBA “lobbying”
for accuracy before it was considered by the Board. Accordingly, these claims will not be
discussed in this memorandum of law.
Petitioner must have raised the issues in the administrative appeal in order to preserve it
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for an Article 78 proceeding. Since these issues have not been raised in his administrative appeal,
before the board, they have not been preserved. Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op.
02494, 2017 WL 1167591 (3rd Dept. Mar. 30, 2017); Matter of Tafari v. Evans, 102 A.D.3d 1053,
1054 (3rd Dept.), lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 852 (2013); Matter of Santos v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1059 (3rd
Dept. 2011). Even if properly before the Court, they too are without merit and should be dismissed.
Accompanying this Memorandum of Law is Respondent’s Answer, including a portion of
the Record of the Proceedings before the Board of Parole.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
The Board considered all of the relevant Executive Law § 259-i factors, and thus, judicial
intervention is not warranted. “[I]t is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary
and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of
Executive Law § 259-i.” Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214,
1215 (3rd Dept. 2014), quoting Matter of De Los Santos v. Division of Parole, 96 A.D.3d 1321,
1322 (3rd Dept. 2012). Executive Law §259-i’s statutory factors, which the Board must consider,
are:
(i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interactions with staff and inmates;
(ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release program;
(iii) release plans including community resources, employment, education and
training and support services available to the inmate;
(iv) any deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate
while in the custody of the department and any recommendation regarding
deportation made by the commissioner of the department pursuant to section one
hundred forty-seven of the correction law;
(v) any statement made to the board by the crime victim or the victim's
representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically
3
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incapacitated;
(vi) the length of the determinate sentence to which the inmate would be subject
had he or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of the
penal law for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or article two hundred
twenty-one of the penal law;
(vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence,
length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district
attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation report as well as
consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following
arrest prior to confinement; and
(viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment
to any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (i-viii).
Importantly, “[a]bsent failure by the Board to comply with the mandates of Executive Law
Article 12-B, [j]udicial intervention is warranted only when there is a showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety.” Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d
1268, 1269 (3rd Dept. 2014), quoting Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476 (2000),
quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[t]he Board need not enumerate, give equal weight or
explicitly discuss every factor considered and [is] entitled … to place a greater emphasis on the
gravity of [petitioner’s] crime.” Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203 (3rd Dept.
2014), quoting Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 A.D.3d 1099 (3rd Dept. 2010); Matter of Leung
v. Evans, 120 A.D.3d 1478, 1479 (3rd Dept. 2014).
THE EMPHASIS ON PETITIONER’S INSTANT OFFENSE WAS NOT IMPROPER.
Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the Board did not deny Petitioner release to parole
supervision exclusively upon the nature of the instant offense. The instant offense, as well as
Petitioner’s prior criminal record, is discussed in the decision.
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acknowledged Petitioner’s risk to society, rehabilitation efforts, release plans, Case Plan,
Sentencing Minutes, COMPAS and all other required statutory factors. The reasons stated by the
Board members for holding Petitioner are clearly sufficient grounds to support their decision. (See
Exhibit H; Exhibit I).
In addition to other factors considered, the Board cited the Petitioner’s history of unlawful
and violent conduct and a negative aspect of the COMPAS instrument. Executive Law § 259i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308 (3rd Dept. 2016);
Matter of Kenefick v. Sticht, 139 A.D.3d 1380 (4th Dept. 2016); Matter of Moore v. New York
State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375 (3rd Dept. 2016).
“The Board is obligated to consider petitioner’s prior criminal record and the brutal nature
of the offense for which he is presently incarcerated (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]).”
Matter of Partee v. Evans, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 1259 (3rd Dept. 2014).

It was also obligated to

consider both “petitioner's lack of remorse and [his] failure to accept responsibility” for his instant
offense. Matter of Khatib v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 1208 (3rd Dept.
2014), as discussed in its decision.
The Board relied on the fact that Petitioner expressed limited remorse for the death of his
two victims. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478 (2000); Matter of Dudley v. Travis,
227 A.D.2d 863 (3rd Dept. 1996), lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 812 (1996).
Insofar as Petitioner may dispute the Board’s finding as to remorse, it was within the
Board’s authority to make an assessment and there is ample support in the interview transcript.
Petitioner appears to have presented as combative and with an attitude of entitlement. (Exhibit H,
pp. 11-13 and 16-20.) Petitioner explained his participation in the shootings of two unsuspecting
officers as an act of war and seemed to suggest he is the last “political prisoner” of the era. (Id.,
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pp. 6-7, 9, 10).
While Petitioner’s written statement made passing reference to remorse (Petition, Exhibit.
3), at no point during the interview did the petitioner express or demonstrate any remorse for his
victims despite numerous opportunities and implicit invitations. Given the connection between an
inmate’s rehabilitation and remorse for the crime identified by the Court of Appeals in Matter of
Silmon v. Travis, Petitioner’s inability to demonstrate any recognition that his murder of two
police officers was, in fact, not justified by his political convictions provides ample reason to
conclude that his rehabilitation is not yet complete.
The Board acted within its discretion in determining these considerations outweighed other
positive factors and rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this time. See generally People
ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128 (1st Dept. 1983). Further, the Board was fully authorized “to place
a greater emphasis on the gravity of [Petitioner’s] crime.” Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d
197, 203 (3rd Dept. 2014), quoting Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 A.D.3d 1099 (3rd Dept.
2010); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 943 N.Y.S.2d 731, 2012 WL
1400923 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co., March 6, 2012); Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904
(3rd Dept. 2005).
THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS.
Petitioner’s claim that the Board did not properly considered all of the required statutory
factors, and improperly considered non-statutory factors, is without merit.

In evaluating

Petitioner’s record, the Board had for its review and consideration the following: his Sentence and
Commitment and PSI, (Exhibit A; Exhibit B); the Parole Board Report, which contains his
institutional programming, release plans and disciplinary record, (Exhibit C; Exhibit D,
confidential and submitted for in camera inspection), his COMPAS Reentry Risk Assessment,
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(Exhibit F, confidential and submitted for in camera inspection) and Case Plan (Exhibit G).
During the interview, the Board discussed with the Petitioner the events and circumstances
surrounding his instant offense, the Pre-Sentencing Report, and Petitioner’s COMPAS Risk
assessment scoring. Also discussed was Petitioner’s disciplinary history, plans upon release, and
his positive programming. (see generally, Exhibit H).
It is well established that the weight to be accorded each of the requisite factors is within the
discretion of the Parole Board. See, e.g., Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396 (3rd Dept.
2016); Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413 (4th Dept. 2014); People ex rel. Herbert,
97 A.D.2d 128 (1st Dept. 1983). The Board need not explicitly refer to each and every one of them
in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497 (3rd
Dept. 2017); Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141 (3rd Dept. 2016).
Further, in the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the
statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of McKee v. New
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945(3rd Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d
128 (1st Dept. 1983).
Here, insofar as Petitioner suggests the Board failed to fairly consider the requisite factors,
there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges and administrative fact-finders.
People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916 (3rd Dept. 1992).
Courts presume the Parole Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its
obligations. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256 (2000). The record as a whole further reflects the
Board considered the appropriate factors including the instant offenses involving the shooting
deaths of two police officers, Petitioner’s criminal history in California, institutional programming
and accomplishments, disciplinary record, release plan, case plan, and the COMPAS instrument
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as well as the sentencing minutes. Petitioner’s document submissions, a packet by the National
Lawyers Guild, letters of support including from elected officials and the son of one victim, and
petitions for release were also considered by the Board.
Petitioner also was given the opportunity to raise additional matters during the interview
when asked by Commissioner Sharkey, “Sir, is there anything that you and I have not talked about
that you think we ought to know?” Petitioner’s response was “Commissioner Sharkey, in three
consecutive parole hearings which we were engaged in, I think we have covered everything from
A to Z.” (Exhibit H, p. 16.)
Contrary to Petitioner’s claim that the board considered non-statutory factors, the Board
permissibly considered community opposition to release. While the Board may not consider nonstatutory matters like penal philosophy, Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d
788 (1994), the courts have recognized there are additional factors that are relevant to the Board’s
task. Thus, for example, an inmate’s insight and remorse may be considered. Matter of Silmon, 95
N.Y.2d 470 (2000); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308 (3rd
Dept. 2016), lv. denied 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); Matter of Dobranski v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1355 (3rd
Dept. 2011), lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 709 (2011). A history of alcohol or drug abuse also is a
permissible factor. See, e.g., Matter of Sanchez v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1249 (3rd Dept. 2005);
Matter of Brant v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 236 A.D.2d 760, 761, (3rd Dept. 1997).
The Executive Law explicitly recognizes numerous individuals other than those specifically
identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) may appropriately have an opinion to offer on the subject
of an inmate’s possible release back to the community: “Where a crime victim or victim’s
representative as defined in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, or other person submits to the parole
board a written statement concerning the release of an inmate, the parole board shall keep that
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individual’s name and address confidential.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(B) (emphasis added).
(Exhibit M, confidential and submitted for in camera inspection).
Regulation further makes clear that any private citizen has a right to submit correspondence
to the Board supporting or opposing an inmate’s parole release. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2) (“it is
essential… to permit private citizens to express freely their opinions for or against an individual's
parole”). In fact, in considering whether to release an inmate to the community, the Board must assess
whether “his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the
seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).
The Board is presumed to understand its obligations and not substitute another’s opinion for
its own required assessment of whether the inmate’s release is appropriate. However, courts have
reasoned that this assessment may be rationally aided by private citizens expressing their opinion on
the matter. Matter of Krebs v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 9:08-CV-255NAMDEP, 2009 WL
2567779, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009); Seltzer v. Thomas, No. 03 CIV.00931 LTS FM, 2003
WL 21744084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003).
The Board may receive and consider written communications from individuals, other than
those specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an inmate’s release to parole
supervision. Matter of Grigger, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852-853 (3rd Dept. 2004), (recognizing 259i(2)(c)(A)(v)’s list is not the exclusive information the Board may consider and persons in addition
to victims and their families may submit letters), lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 704 (2005); see also Matter
of Rivera v. Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
Co.) (LaBuda A.J.S.C.) (“[c]onsideration of community or other opposition was proper under the
statute” and the Board is required to keep identity of persons opposing release confidential).
The same has also long been recognized as true with respect to letters supporting an
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inmate’s potential parole release. Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273, (3rd Dept. 2014);
Matter of Morrison, 81 A.D.3d 1073 (3rd Dept. 2011); Matter of Cartagena v. Alexander, 64
A.D.3d 841 (3rd Dept. 2009). Indeed, letters (and petitions) favoring an inmate’s release but which
would not constitute, or provide qualified or first-hand accounting of, the specific factors listed in
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i) through (viii), are not uncommon and, in fact, were considered
here. (Petition. Exhibit 4). As expressed by Petitioner during his interview, all private citizens are
entitled to express their opinions. (Exhibit H, pp. 17, 20.)
After considering all required and permissible matters here, the Board issued a decision that
was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. The decision
therefore satisfied the criteria set out in section 259-i of the Executive Law. Executive Law § 259i(2)(a); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435 (1st Dept. 2013);
Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128 (1st Dept. 1983).
As for any similarity to prior decisions, because the Board is required to consider the same
statutory factors each time an inmate appears, it follows that the Board may deny release on the
same grounds as relied upon in previous determinations. Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d
821 (3rd Dept. 2003); see also Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105 (1st Dept. 2008)
aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 777 (2008). However, there is no requirement that a second Board panel must
follow the recommendation of a prior Board panel. Matter of Flores v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 210 A.D.2d 555 (3rd Dept. 1994). Each interview is a new assessment.
Because all of the Executive Law § 259-i factors were addressed within either the record
before the Board or at Petitioner’s interview, and the Board’s decision need not discuss every
factor (Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203 (3rd Dept. 2014), Petitioner makes no
“showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” quoting Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d
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470, 476 (2000) quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, as set forth above, the Board considered all of
the statutory factors.
THE BOARD INCORPORATED RISK AND NEEDS PRINCIPLES WHEN IT
IMPLEMENTED NEW WRITTEN PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO THE AMENDED
EXECUTIVE LAW.
Petitioner incorrectly suggests that the Board failed to comply with the amendments to the
Executive Law. Petitioner’s interview with the Board of Parole took place on June 21, 2016. For
Board interviews that occurred prior to July 30, 2014, the 2011 Amendment to Executive Law §
259-c (4) had been implemented according to former Chairwoman Andrea Evans’ October 5, 2011
Memorandum to the Board of Parole (hereinafter “October 2011 memorandum”). (Exhibit L).
Pursuant to the October 2011 memorandum, the Board must, in pertinent part, perform a
“COMPAS” risk and needs assessment. In rejecting a challenge to the efficacy of the 2011
memorandum and COMPAS instrument, the Third Department explicitly held that “the October
2011 memorandum sufficiently establishes the requisite procedures for ‘incorporat[ing] risk and
needs principles’ into the process of making parole release decisions.” Matter of Montane v.
Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202 (3rd Dept. 2014). “[T]he Board satisfied its obligations under the
2011 amendments to Executive Law § 259-c (4).” (Id)
The Board then, on July 30, 2014, incorporated the October 2011 memorandum into its
regulations. “[T]he Board has [now] promulgated regulations for parole release decision-making
procedures, which became effective July 30, 2014, that are consistent with the procedures set forth
in the [October] 2011 memorandum (see 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.3).” Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci,
122 A.D.3d 1413, 1414 (4th Dept. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the October 2011 memorandum properly implemented Executive Law §259-c
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(4)’s 2011 amendment and the Board’s new regulation (9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.3) is consistent with
such memorandum, the new regulation itself has appropriately instituted a risk and needs
assessment in accord with the 2011 Executive Law § 259-c (4) amendment.
By considering the COMPAS instrument, the Board adequately incorporated the risk and
needs assessment into determining whether Petitioner should be released. Matter of Montane v.
Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202 (3rd Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d
1036 (3rd Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558 (4th Dept. 2014). (Exhibit
F, confidential and submitted for in camera inspection).
Notably, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137
A.D.3d 1396 (2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must
weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the statute’s standards
are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108 (3rd Dept.
2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059 (3rd Dept. 2014); Matter of Jones v.
NYS Bd. of Parole, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 31816, 2015 WL 5840088 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Sept. 11,
2015) (Feldstein A.J.S.C.) (risk assessment serves to “assist” Board and does not supersede
independent authority of the Board to determine, based on its consideration of the § 259-i(2)(c)(A)
factors, whether an inmate should be released).
Indeed, the Legislature stressed that the 2011 amendments were not intended to interfere
with the Board's fundamental . . . authority to make release decisions based on the [B]oard
members’ independent judgment and application of statutory criteria (L 2011, ch 62, § 1, part C,
§ 1, subpart A, § 1).” Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d at 202 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As the record demonstrates that the Department prepared a COMPAS risk assessment for
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Petitioner, and the Board considered that COMPAS prior to it issuing its decision, the Board fully
complied with the written procedures. (Exhibit F, confidential and submitted for in camera
inspection; Exhibit H).
THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS PROPERLY DETAILED.
Petitioner’s argument that the Board did not provide detailed reasons for its denial of his
parole is entirely without merit. Because the decision was sufficiently detailed to “permit
intelligent judicial review of the grounds for the Board's denial of parole release,” this portion of
the Petition must be denied. Matter of Zhang v. Travis, 10 A.D.3d 828, 829 (3rd Dept. 2004);
Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 11 N.Y.3d 777 (2008); Matter of Burress v Evans, 107 A.D.3d
1216 (3rd Dept. 2013).
Moreover, Petitioner offered no factual proof to substantiate his claim that the Board’s
denial was predetermined. Due to this lack of proof and because “the Board is presumed to have
acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements”, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the
Board’s denial of his release is irrational bordering on impropriety. Matter of Nankervis v.
Dennison, 30 A.D.3d 521, 522 (2nd Dept. 2006); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
157 A.D.2d 944 (3rd Dept. 1990); Matter of Bottom v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 30 A.D.3d
657, fn. (3rd Dept. 2006).
Because, as set forth herein, the Board considered all of the statutory factors, the record
belies petitioner's contention that the Board's determination denying his request for parole release
was predetermined. Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190,
1190 (3rd Dept. 2006); Matter of Black v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 54 A.D.3d 1076 (3rd Dept.
2008).
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Petitioner’s due process rights and constitutional rights have not been violated. Given that
“the Board properly took into account the factors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i”, Petitioner
was afforded all of the process he was due. Matter of Borcsok v. New York State Div. of Parole,
34 A.D.3d 961 (3rd Dept. 2006).
Moreover, “Executive Law § 259-i does not create an entitlement to release on parole and
therefore does not create interests entitled to due process protection.” Matter of Freeman v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 (3rd Dept. 2005), quoting Matter of Paunetto v.
Hammock, 516 F. Supp. 1367 (1981); Matter of Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50
N.Y.2d 69 (1980).
At the federal level, there is no constitutional liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of
early release and no inherent constitutional right to parole, Matter of Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 10 (1979), or to be released before the
expiration of a valid sentence. Matter of Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011). Also, under
the New York State constitution, there is no due process right to parole. Matter of Russo v. New
York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980); Matter of Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661
(2d Cir. 1979). As such, Petitioner’s claim should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Under Executive Law § 259-i (5), actions undertaken by the Parole Board are deemed to
be judicial functions and are not reviewable when made in accordance with law. Matter of Kelly
v. Hagler, 94 A.D.3d 1301 (3rd Dept. 2012); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385 (2nd
Dept. 2004); Matter of Cruz v. Travis, 273 A.D.2d 648 (3rd Dept. 2000).
The petitioner has the heavy burden of showing that the Board’s determination is irrational
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“bordering on impropriety” before judicial intervention is warranted. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95
N.Y.2d 470, 476, (2000); Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980); Matter of Mullins, 136 A.D.3d
1141(3rd Dept. 2016); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128 (1st Dept. 1983 ).
The Board’s decision cannot be called an abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious.
Accordingly, the Petition should be denied and this proceeding dismissed in its entirety.
Dated: June 9, 2017
Albany, New York
Lynn Knapp Blake
Lynn Knapp Blake
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